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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 20000034-CA 
v. : 
LESLIE GENE LOYA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a 
forged check, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did defendant have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a motel room 
when police officers entered an open room in response to a disturbance 
created by defendant's mother two and one-half hours after defendant's 
lease on the room had expired? 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to this issue. A trial court's underlying 
factual findings are reviewed deferentially and reversed only for "clear error." See State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Wright, 1999 UT App 86, f 6, 977 
P.2d 505. Its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, allowing some "measure of 
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i 
discretion" in the application of legal standards to the facts. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-
40; Wright, 1999 UT App 86, ^ 6. 
| 
II. Did the police officers have probable cause to enter defendant's motel room 
two and one-half hours after check-out time when the officers arrived at the 
room at the request of the manager and where the officers observed 
belligerent behavior by defendant's mother before they entered the room? 
Because the trial court did not reach this issue, no standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
 | 
U.S. Const Amend. IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against \ 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE I 
On August 12, 1999, defendant was charged with five counts of possession of a 
forged check, each a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-502 
(1999) (R. 3-4). After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on all charges 
(R. 13-19). 
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized in a 
warrantless search of her motel room (R. 24-27). After an evidentiary hearing, 
defendant's motion was denied (R. 47). The trial court's findings, conclusions of law, 1 
and order were entered October 29,1999 (R. 59-64; Addendum A). 
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Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a 
forged check, preserving her right under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 937-39 (Utah App. 
1988), to appeal the trial court's ruling on her motion to suppress (R. 48-57). 
On November 24, 1999, defendant filed a motion to amend the trial court's 
findings (R. 65-66; Addendum B). A final order of sentence, judgment, and commitment 
was entered on December 21, 1999 (R. 70-72). The trial court then entered an order 
granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion to amend (R. 82; Addendum C). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 73, 86-87). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 31, 1999, defendant, identifying herself as Leslie Walters, rented room 
331 for one person at the Suburban Lodge of America in Midvale, Utah (R. 91:6-7). At 
that time, defendant was informed that the normal check out time was 11:00 a.m. (R. 
91:8,12,20). 
Defendant paid for her room through the night of August 6, 1999 and was to check 
out of the room by 11:00 a.m. on August 7 (R. 91:8,12,20). On the morning of August 
7, defendant told the general manager, Margie Hathenbruck, that she needed more time to 
get out of the room (R. 91:6, 13). The manager informed defendant that she had to either 
pay or be out of the room by 11:00 a.m. (R. 91:13). However, the manager may have 
given defendant a one-hour grace period (R. 91:13). Still, the manager emphasized to 
defendant "that we close at 2:00 that day and we most definitely had to be out before 
3 
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then" (R. 91:13). w*[I]t's possible that [defendant] could have said that she was trying to 
get [the room] for another day" (R. 91:22). However, defendant never paid any
 ; 
additional rent to the Lodge (R. 91:15). 
About 1:00 p.m., the manager went to Room 331, expecting it to be empty (R. 
91:14,22). "I knew by then that they just should have been out, because I hadn't had any 
rent paid" (R. 91:22). When she knocked, however, defendant's mother came to the door 
(R. 91:14). The manager reminded defendant that she had said she would "get out" and 
again told defendant to leave, explaining "that I needed them to be out immediately so I 
could close my office" (R. 91:15). The manager saw "some backpacks and bags on the 
bed and [defendant] was putting things in them, she was trying to get her things together" 
(R. 91:24). Defendant's mother, however, told the manager: "She's getting ready and 
we'll be out when we're ready" but that it was unlikely they'd be out by 2:00 p.m. (R. 
91:15-16). As the conversation continued, the mother began "getting nasty" and 
eventually "slammed the door in [the manager's] face" (R. 91:16). The mother was not 
authorized to stay in defendant's room (R. 91:27). 
The manager left but soon returned to Room 331 with the motel maintenance man, 
intending to stay in defendant's room until defendant finished packing (R. 91:16-17). 
The manager explained: "I wasn't getting cooperation from the people in the room and I 
didn't want to go in there alone" (R. 91:16). However, defendant's mother continued to 
give the manager and the maintenance man "a really hard time" (R. 91:17). Thus, the 
4 
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manager decided to go back to her office "to get help from the police to get them out of 
the room" (R. 91:16-17). 
The manager explained: "There was something that had gone on that had made me 
want to get them out of the room because usually we're, you know, really lenient at 
working with people if they want to pay the next day and stuff; but I can't remember the 
details" (R. 91:18). 
Police Officers Volpe and Proulx arrived at the Lodge at about 1:30 p.m. (R. 
91:25, 29). The manager explained to them "that the rent hadn't been paid and that I had 
asked the guests to leave and that they were still in the room and didn't think that they 
would be out and I needed to get them out so I could close my lodge" (R. 91:27). The 
officers went up to the room together (R. 91:30). They did not knock on the door 
because, when they arrived, "the door was open . . . [a]ll the way" (R. 91:31). 
Officer Proulx entered the motel room first to quell the disturbance still being 
made by defendant's mother (R. 91:38). Officer Volpe explained that while the officers 
were outside the room attempting to get additional information from the manager, 
defendant's mother "repeatedly was interrupting us and yelling . . . , so [Officer Proulx] 
entered the room and brought her to the far side of the room and explained to her that she 
would have her turn to talk to me and that she just needed to keep quiet until I was 
finished with [the manager]" (R. 91:37-38). After "receiving the information from the 
5 
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i 
manager as to the situation, what the problem was and what she wanted done," Officer 
Volpe also entered the room (R. 91:31).1 
4 
The officers did not have a warrant to enter the room and did not request 
permission from either defendant or her mother to do so (R. 91:31). Their understanding 
was that defendant and her mother "were paid up through 11:00 a.m. that morning, it was ^ 
after that point. We were there to insure that [defendant and her mother] left the room 
immediately" (R. 91:31-32). Although the officers were aware that the manager and 
defendant had possibly made some arrangements, they were also aware of the prior 
altercation between the manager and defendant's mother, and it was now about 1:45 
i 
p.m.—fifteen minutes before the Lodge office was supposed to close (R. 33-35). 
After hearing this evidence, the court denied defendant's motion to suppress, 
ruling: < 
It seems to me in this matter that the conduct of the 
officers was entirely appropriate, it was at the direction of the 
manager who was rightly confronted with a situation that 
needed to avoid the potential breach of the peace, the 
intercession of the officers. , 
The defendant and/or her roommates, her mother or 
whomever, were, at the point that the officers arrived at the 
direction of the manager, hold-over tenants, had no right to 
demand and/or refuse entrance by the officers, especially who 
^nce in the room, the officers apparently located drug paraphernalia in plain view 
on one of defendant's backpacks (Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) at 2). Further 
search of her bags revealed additional drug paraphernalia as well as the checks which 
served as the basis for this prosecution (PSI at 2). 
6 
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were functioning at the direction of the manger, who had the 
legal authority to enter the room under the appropriate 
circumstances, and I consider these circumstances to have 
been appropriate. 
The motion to suppress is denied. 
(R. 91:38-39). 
The court made the following written findings of fact: 
(10) That Lodge Manager [Hathenbruck] telephoned the 
Midvale City Police Department. 
(11) That Officers Volpe and Proulx were dispatched to the 
Suburban Lodge of Midvale. 
(12) That Lodge Manager [Hathenbruck] explained the 
situation with defendant and her mother to the Midvale 
Police Officers. 
(13) That the officers went to Room 331 at the direction of 
Lodge Manager [Hathenbruck], to assist in peacefully 
causing defendant and her mother to vacate the room. 
(14) That the officers observed defendant and her mother in 
Room 331 through an open door. 
(15) That the officers entered Room 331 without asking 
permission to do so from defendant [nor] did they have 
a search warrant in their possession. 
(R. 60-61). The court also found that "[o]n the date in question, the officers' involvement 
occurred at approximately 1:30 p.m." (R. 66, 82). The court concluded "as a matter of 
law, that defendant was a holdover tenant in Room 331, she had no right to demand to 
7 
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remain and the Midvale Officers' warrantless entry into the room was not unlawful" (R. 
61). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress because defendant 
failed to establish that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room in 
which she was a hold-over tenant. In any case, the police officers here had probable 
cause to enter the motel room through an open door after defendant had been thrice told j 
to vacate the room, when the officers had been called to the room by the manager to assist 
in evicting defendant and when the officers entered the room only in order to quell a 
i 
disturbance created by defendant's mother. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT HAD NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY IN THE MOTEL ROOM WHEN THE OFFICERS 
LAWFULLY ENTERED IT 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to 
suppress because the officers improperly entered her motel room without probable cause 
and exigent circumstances. See Aplt. Br. at 21-22. Defendant does not argue that, once 
inside the room, the officers lacked probable cause to arrest her or to conduct a search 
incident to that arrest. 
Whether defendant has standing to challenge the admission of evidence under the 
8 
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Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution depends on whether she can 
establish that she had a "'legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.'" State 
v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 80 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted); see also State v. Brown, 
853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992); State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah App. 1993); 
State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Utah App. 1992). Here, the invaded place was a 
motel room that the police officers entered after defendant's rental period had terminated. 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that she had "a legitimate, continuing expectation of 
privacy on [her] part while [she] remained in the room after the rental period had ended." 
Commonwealth v. Brass, 674 N.E.2d 1326, 1327 (Mass. App. 1997). Thus, the trial court 
properly denied her motion to suppress. 
"A legitimate expectation of privacy incorporates two elements: first, whether the 
defendant 'exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,' and second, whether 
that subjective expectation is 'one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.'" 
Webb, 790 P.2d at 80 (citations omitted); see also State v. Matison, 875 P.2d 584, 587-88 
(Utah App. 1994); Scott, 860 P.2d at 1007. 
Factors relevant to [the first element] include whether the 
defendant had any possessory or proprietary interest in the 
place searched or the item seized in the challenged search; 
was legitimately on the premises; had the right to exclude 
others from that place; exhibited a subjective expectation that 
the place would remain free from governmental invasion; or 
took normal precautions to maintain [her] privacy. 
Webb, 790 P.2d at 80; see also State v. Whitrock, 468 N.W.2d 696, 705 (Wis. 1991). In 
9 
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deciding the second element, the court must balance the interests of society against the 
interests of the person whose privacy is being asserted. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 
I 
517, 525 n.7 (1984); see also Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 620 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa. 
1993). 
Here, defendant asserts that her "subjective expectation of privacy in the room" 
was "demonstrated by her continued occupancy, the fact that her belongings were still in 
the room, her conversation with the manager indicating that she needed more time, and
 t 
the manager's recognition that she may have extended the time." Aplt. Br. at 14, 17-18. 
She further asserts that "such expectation was reasonable in light of Ms. Hathenbruck's 
extension of the time in which [defendant] could remain in the room and the motel's 
practice of allowing a renter[] to stay beyond the 11:00 a.m. checkout time." Id. at 14-15. 
A. Defendant has not demonstrated an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy 
Whether a defendant has the requisite subjective expectation of privacy "is a 
question of intent, which may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other 
objective facts." Matison, 875 P.2d at 587-88 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
On the morning of August 7, before the motel's announced 11:00 a.m. check-out 
time, defendant approached the manager and requested additional time to vacate her room 
(R. 91:13,22). The manager told her "that she had to pay or be out of the room" by the 
11:00 a.m. check-out time (R. 91:13). The manager may have extended the time, 
10 
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however, because the Lodge "usually give[s] [guests] a one-hour grace period" (R. 
91:13). It is also possible that defendant mentioned staying another night (R. 91:22). 
However, because the manager did not hear from defendant again and did not 
receive payment for an additional day's lodging two hours after normal check-out time, 
she expected defendant to be gone when she went to check the room at 1:00 p.m. (R. 
91:15, 22). Instead, the manager saw "some backpacks and bags on the bed and 
[defendant] was putting things in them, she was trying to get her things together" (R. 
91:24). When the manager found defendant and her mother still there, she reiterated "that 
they told me that they would be out" (R. 91:15). After the manager explained a second 
time that defendant had to definitely be out by 2:00 p.m. because that was when the 
Lodge office closed, defendant's mother said "she didn't think they could do it and they'd 
be out of there when they were out of there" and then slammed the door in the manager's 
face (R. 91:16). The manager returned to the room shortly thereafter, with the 
maintenance man, to "stay there until they packed their things up" (R. 91:16). When 
defendant's mother again began giving the Lodge personnel a difficult time, the manager 
decided to call the police (R. 91:17). When the police arrived, the door to defendant's 
motel room was completely open (R. 91:31). Defendant's mother was again causing a 
commotion (R. 91:37-38). 
Applying the factors set forth in Webb, 790 P.2d at 80, to these facts, it is clear that 
defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy by the time the police officers entered 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
her room at approximately 1:45 p.m. First, defendant's possessory interest in the motel 
room expired when her rental period ended or, at most, when, once the grace period 
expired one hour after the posted check-out time, defendant had not paid for another 
day's stay. See Webb, 790 P.2d at 80. Even if defendant originally interpreted the 
manager's instructions as giving her until 2:00 p.m. to vacate the room, that offer, if it 
ever existed, was certainly revoked when the manager told defendant at 1:00 pm. to leave 
immediately and was told in response that defendant would probably not even be out by 
2:00 p.m. (R. 91:15-16) and then had the door slammed in her face.2 Certainly, when the 
2Thus, even if the trial court's finding #3 were clearly erroneous, as defendant 
claims, see Aplt. Br. at 15-17 & n.3, such error would not undermine the trial court's 
ruling that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy when the officers entered 
the room at approximately 1:45 p.m. In any case, the evidence is sufficient to uphold the 
trial court's finding. Finding #3 states: "That defendant was informed by Lodge 
Manager Margie Hathenbrock [sic] that defendant must either pay rent for an additional 
day or vacate the room on August 7, 1999, by 11:00 a.m., the specified hour to vacate the 
room" (R. 60). At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the manager testified 
that defendant had been told when she originally registered that check-out time was 11:00 
a.m. (R. 91:8). She also testified that, when defendant approached her on August 7 before 
11:00 a.m. requesting additional time to vacate the room, the manager's initial response 
was that defendant had to either pay or be out of the room by 11:00 a.m. (R. 91:13). That 
the manager may have later given defendant some additional time—as the trial court 
found in finding #4 (R. 60)—does not alter what defendant was originally told concerning 
the need to pay or vacate by 11.00 a.m. 
Furthermore, defendant's assertion that the manager clearly extended defendant's 
check-out time to 2:00 p.m., see Aplt. Br. at 17 n.3, is not supported by the evidence. The 
manager told defendant repeatedly that she needed to close the motel office by 2:00 p.m. 
(R. 91:13,15). In order to close the office by 2:00 p.m., the manager had to have 
defendant out of the room before then. See R. 91:13 (manager told defendant "that we 
close at 2:00 that day and we most definitely had to be out before then (emphasis added)); 
R. 91:15 (manager told defendant at 1:00 p.m. "that I needed them to be out immediately 
so I could close my office" (emphasis added)). 
12 
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manager returned with the maintenance man a short time later to ensure that defendant 
vacated the room (R. 91:16-17), it was clear that defendant's possessory interest in the 
room had expired. The manager was, after all, essentially trying to evict her. 
Second, because defendant's rental period had ended and because she had failed to 
pay for another day's stay before the one-hour grace period expired, defendant was no 
longer legitimately on the premises. See Webb, 790 P.2d at 80. Defendant knew this 
because the motel manager had now told her repeatedly to leave. See United States v. 
Singleton, 922 F. Supp. 1522, 1529 (D. Kansas 1996) (holding defendant "could not have 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the [motel] room" when it was "uncontroverted 
that [the manager] openly treated [defendant and his guest] as hold-over tenants"). The 
fact that defendant was attempting to pack as quickly as possible when the manager 
checked the room at 1:00 p.m. further supports the conclusion that defendant knew she 
had no further claim to the room (R. 91:24). 
Third, because defendant had failed to pay for another day's stay or request 
additional time to vacate her room, her right to exclude others had expired by the time the 
officers arrived. Webb, 790 P.2d at 80. Defendant appears to have acknowledged this 
fact because, although there is evidence that the mother objected to the manager's 
presence in defendant's motel room, there is no evidence indicating that defendant herself 
objected to the manager's entering the room either at 1:00 p.m., or shortly thereafter when 
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i 
the manager returned with the maintenance man. In addition, by 1:30 p.m., defendant 
was leaving her room door open (R. 91:31). 
I 
Fourth, defendant neither exhibited a subjective expectation that the motel room 
would remain free from governmental invasion nor took normal precautions to maintain 
her privacy. Again, the door was open when the officers arrived at approximately 1:45 ' 
p.m. (R. 91:31). Furthermore, there is no evidence that defendant objected to Officer 
Proulx's entry into the room to quell her mother's anger. I 
Finally, defendant's attempt to establish a subjective expectation of privacy based 
on the motel's pattern and practice of allowing tenants to extend their tenancy without 
immediately paying for the extension fails. To create an expectation of privacy on the 
part of a hold-over tenant, the pattern or practice must be established with that specific 
tenant. See United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 31-32 (^Cir.WW); United States v. 
Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 150 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Watson, 783 F. Supp. 258, 
264 (E.D.Va. 1992); People v. Montoya, 914 P.2d 491,492 (Colo. App. 1995); State v. 
Davis, 937 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Wash. App. 1997). If the pattern or practice does not relate 
to the specific tenant, she should at least have to demonstrate that she was aware of the 
practice. Although defendant here did establish that such a pattern or practice exists as a 
general policy with the hotel, she presented no evidence that she was aware of the pattern 
or practice when she stayed past the check-out time without paying. 
14 
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As discussed above, defendant has the burden to establish that she had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the Lodge's room 331. See Brown, 853 P.2d at 855; Scott, 860 
P.2d at 1007; Atwood, 831 P.2d at 1058; Webb, 790 P.2d at 80. Defendant has failed to 
carry that burden. Under the Webb factors, it is apparent that defendant had no subjective 
expectation of privacy in her motel room when the officers entered it on August 7, two 
and one-half hours after the Lodge's posted check-out time and one and one-half hours 
after any grace period had expired, and after the manager had essentially revoked any 
permission she had given defendant to continue occupying the room. 
B. Even if defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy, 
that expectation was not one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable 
"Generally, a guest does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel 
room after his rental period has terminated" unless "there is a pattern or practice which 
would make that expectation reasonable.'9 Kitchens, 114 F.3d at 31-32. That pattern or 
practice, however, must relate to that specific guest. See id; see also Owens, 782 P.2d at 
150; Watson, 783 F. Supp. at 264; Montoya, 914 P.2d at 492; Davis, 937 P.2d at 1113. 
The burden is on defendant to prove that such a pattern or practice exists. See Webb, 790 
P.2d at 80; Brown, 853 P.2d at 855; Scott, 860 P.2d at 1007; Atwood, 831 P.2d at 1058. 
Here, the only allusion defendant made to a possible pattern or practice of letting 
defendant stay past the Lodge's check-out time was that she may have been allowed to 
pay after the check-out time on August 6 to retain the room for that night. Initially, even 
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if defendant was allowed to pay late once, a one-time exception to the rules does not 
make a pattern or practice. Furthermore, the manager, to whom the defendant presented 
her question, never stated positively that a late payment had been allowed; the manager 
testified only that she did not recall (R. 91:11, 19). Defendant, who called neither herself 
nor her mother at the suppression hearing, presented no other evidence on this point. 
Thus, defendant has failed to establish that any pattern or practice existed allowing 
defendant to pay for a room after the check-out time had expired. See Brass, 674 N.E.2d 
at 1327; see also Scott, 860 P.2d at 1007; Atwood, 831 P.2d at 1058. 
Moreover, other circumstances in this case indicate that no such pattern or practice 
existed and that any expectation of privacy on defendant's part was thus unreasonable. 
Defendant was thrice warned, prior to the officers' arrival, that she was supposed to have 
vacated the room by 11:00 a.m. See United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) 
(holding that "[o]nce the manager, through private action, took possession of the motel 
room, [defendant] could no longer assert a legitimate privacy interest in its contents"), 
cert denied, 520 U.S. 1281 (1997); Singleton, 922 F. Supp. at 1529 (holding that it was 
not reasonable for tenant to have expectation of privacy in room when manager openly 
treated tenant as hold-over tenant). On two of those occasions, the manager was met by 
nasty behavior by defendant's mother, who not only stated that defendant would be out 
only when she was ready, but also slammed the motel door in the manager's face. See 
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State v. Perkins, 588 N.W.2d 491, 492-93 (Minn. 1999) (holding that disruptive conduct 
by hotel guest had effect of terminating guest's reasonable expectation of privacy). 
Finally, in balancing the interests of society against the interests of this defendant, 
see Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525 n.7, Brundidge, 620 A.2d at 1118, the scale tips decidedly in 
society's favor. This is not a case where officers rushed into defendant's motel room 
moments after the expiration of her rental period to search the room under the pretext of 
evicting a hold-over tenant. Cf. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951) (finding 
fourth amendment violation where purpose of entry into hotel room was solely to search 
for narcotics); Owens, 782 F.2d at 150 (finding fourth amendment violation where hotel 
management gave officers permission to search room within short period after check-out 
time where there was pattern of allowing tenant to pay late); Watson, 783 F. Supp. at 259, 
264 (E.D.Va. 1992) (same). Rather, this is a case where a motel room tenant was told 
more than once prior to check-out time that she had to either vacate her room or pay for 
another day (R. 91:8, 12-13, 20). When defendant asked for additional time, she was 
given the usual one-hour grace period to leave her room and was not actually bothered by 
the manager again until two hours after the check-out time had passed (R. 91:13, 14, 23). 
Although defendant knew that the manager was under a time constraint, defendant never 
indicated that she would vacate her room within the necessary time. Indeed, her mother 
made it clear that defendant would not vacate the room on time (R. 91:15-16). Moreover, 
defendant's mother was repeatedly disruptive when the manager tried to enforce the 
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motel's right to have its room back (R. 91:16-17). If the officers were not allowed to 
assist in removing defendant under such circumstances, "defendant could create a bubble 
I 
of constitutional protection for [her]self simply by holding over in a motel or hotel room 
hours after checkout time until being physically ejected from the room." Brass, 674 
N.E.2datl329. < 
Thus, any expectation of privacy defendant had in her motel room two and one-
half hours after check-out time was objectively unreasonable. 
II. THE POLICE OFFICERS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ENTER 
DEFENDANT'S MOTEL ROOM TO QUELL A DISTURBANCE 
CAUSED BY DEFENDANT'S MOTHER AND TO ASSIST THE 
MANAGER IN HAVING THE ROOM VACATED 4 
Even if this Court determines that defendant did retain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the motel room two and one-half hours after check-out time, this Court may 
i 
nonetheless uphold the trial court's ruling if it concludes that the officers, who were 
called by the motel manager to help evict defendant, had probable cause to enter 
defendant's motel room through an open door in response to defendant's mother's 
conduct. Although the trial court below did not make any findings concerning the 
existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances, this Court may affirm a trial 
court's ruling on any ground clear in the trial court's record. State v. Chevre, 2000 UT 
App 6,112,994 P.2d 1278; Boudreaux v. State, 1999 UT App 310,131,989 P.2d 1103. 
If the Court cannot affirm the trial court's ruling on this alternative ground based on the 
current record, the proper remedy is not reversal but rather vacation of the trial court's 
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ruling and remand to the trial court for further proceedings on the issues of probable 
cause and exigent circumstances. 
A. Both probable cause and exigent circumstances were present when the 
officers entered defendant's motel room 
"Probable cause is present when the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] 
knowledge and of which they ha[ve] reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient 
in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has 
been or is being committed." State v. Wright, 1999 UT App 86, % 8, 977 P.2d 505 
(brackets in original; citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Exigent 
circumstances are those that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . . . 
was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of 
relevant evidence . . . , or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law 
enforcement efforts." State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 n.2 (Utah App. 1997) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, "[a]s with any law, a proper application of the provisions of the 
Constitution is aided by reflection upon the circumstances out of which it arose and the 
purpose it was intended to serve." State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272,444 P.2d 517, 518 
(Utah 1968). Thus, in applying the fourth amendment, it must "be remembered that the 
provision . . . had its origin as a safeguard against highhanded and ruthless intrusions . . . 
by officials of an oppressive government." Id. It is also important that the protections of 
the provision "do not become so extended beyond their reasons for being that even where 
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i 
there is no danger or likelihood of any such abuse, they provide a cloak of protection by 
which those engaged in criminal activities may escape detection and punishment." Id. at 
519. 
Thus, although a person typically has a fourth amendment right to privacy in the 
motel room which she is currently renting, "[t]he law does not prohibit every entry, 
without a warrant, into a [m]otel room." Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51. Circumstances, such as 
questions of violence, "might make exceptions." Id. at 51-52. The focus is on the \ 
officers' information at the time any entry, search, or seizure is conducted. See Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990); see also Mendez v People, 986 P.2d 275, 280 
i 
(Colo. 1999) (en banc), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 1680 (2000). 
In this case, the police officers were called to the Lodge by its manager to assist in 
removing defendant from her room (R. 91:16-17). The officers were told that defendant 
was a hold-over tenant and that her mother had become belligerent toward the manager 
on at least one prior occasion (R. 91:27, 33-35). See State v. Whitrock, 468 N.W.2d 696, 
701 (Wise. 1991) (holding that even if defendant had legitimate expectation in leased 
premises, "the police properly entered the duplex under the reasonable belief that the 
landlord had authority to consent to their entry"); cf Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185-86. 
The officers and manager then approached the room almost simultaneously (R. 
91:30-31). When they arrived at the open door to defendant's motel room, defendant's 
mother again began a disturbance, apparently yelling both at the police and the manager 
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(R. 91:37-38). Under such circumstances, the officers had probable cause to enter 
defendant's room through an open door. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 (1999) 
(defining disorderly conduct); cf People v. Goldberg, 82 Cal.Rptr. 314, 316 (Cal. App. 
1969) ("Having probable cause to arrest for disturbing the peace, the officer had sufficient 
cause to go to defendant's door to seek an interview."); Carter v. State, 490 N.E.2d 288, 
290 (Ind. 1986) (holding that officer's approach to open hotel door to investigate 
disturbance did not offend fourth amendment). 
Furthermore, exigent circumstances existed. The officers knew that defendant's 
mother had previously been belligerent toward the manager (R. 91:33-35). In addition, 
the officers themselves witnessed the mother's lack of control when they arrived outside 
defendant's room and the mother immediately began yelling at them (R. 91:37-38). 
Under such circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that immediate entry 
was necessary to defuse the mother's anger before the situation escalated to violence and 
to ensure that the disagreement between the mother and the manager could be settled 
peacefully. See Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 n.2. 
B. If this Court decides that defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in her motel room when the officers entered but cannot 
determine on this record that probable cause and exigent 
circumstances existed, remand rather than reversal is the proper 
remedy 
If this Court cannot conclude on the current record that the police officers had 
probable cause to enter defendant's motel room, this Court must remand the matter to the 
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trial court for additional findings on the issue. Cf. State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 227 
(Utah 1989) (holding that remand is necessary to determine voluntariness of confession 
where trial court "did not address defendant's contention that even though an adequate 
Miranda warning had been given to him, his subsequent confession was the result of 
coercive threats and promises"); State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah App. 1994) 
(ordering remand where illegality of sentence is not evident on the record). 
In such a case, defendant's guilty plea would remain in place pending the trial i 
court's ruling on remand. Rule 1 l(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides only 
that a defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw his or her 
conditional guilty plea. See Utah R. Cr. P. 1 l(i). A defendant has not prevailed on appeal 
where the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the very issue 
brought up on appeal—in this case, the merits of defendant's motion to suppress. Cf. 
State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, <f 38 (refusing to reverse trial court's conviction where trial 
court incorrectly interpreted statutory provision regarding expert witnesses but appeal did , 
not dispose of matter; remedy was remand to the trial court for further proceedings on 
outstanding issues) Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12,138, 973 P.2d 431 (declining to 
award attorneys fees on appeal on issue for which remand was necessary). Thus, 
defendant's guilty plea in this case remains in place under rule 1 l(i) until and unless her 
motion to suppress is finally decided in her favor. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction for one 
count of possession of a forged check. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED j 7 _ July 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
KARENA.KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on _^ _ July 2000,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to Joan C. Watt and 
Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 
300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorneys for Appellant. 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, 4931 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LESLBEGENELOYA, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
CaseNo.991916283FS 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant's Motion To Suppress Evidence Seized In Warrantless Entry of Hotel Room, 
filed in the above-entitled matter, came on for hearing before the Court on October 25, 1999, at 
1:30 p.m. Defendant was present and represented by counsel, Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association, and the State of Utah was represented by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy 
Salt Lake County District Attorney. 
The Motion was submitted to the Court Being fully advised in the premises the Court 
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law: 
FINPINQSOFFACT 
1. That defendant was charged by Information with four counts of Possession of a 
Forged Check and one count of Possession of a Forged Writing, all Third Degree Felonies. 
2. That defendant had rented Room 331, under the name Leslie Walters, at the 
Suburban Lodge of Midvale, 151 West 7200 South, Salt Lake County. 
FILED DISTWCT C0IIIT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 2 9 ;33 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
CaseNo.991916283FS 
Page 2 
3. That defendant was informed by Lodge Manager Margie Hathenbrock that 
defendant must either pay rent for an additional day or vacate the room on August 7,1999, by 
11:00 a.m., the specified hour to vacate the room. 
4. That Lodge Manager Hathenbrock told defendant that the former was willing to 
give defendant some additional time to present the rent 
5. That by shortly after 1:00 p.m., Lodge Manager Hathenbrock had not heard from 
defendant nor had defendant tendered the rent for an additional day. 
6. That shortly after 1:00 p.m. on August 7,1999, Lodge Manager Hathenbrock 
went to Room 331 expecting to find it vacant, 
7. That when she arrived at Room 331, Lodge Manager Hathenbrock found 
defendant and the latter's unregistered mother still in possession of the room. 
8. That defendant9 s mother informed Lodge Manager Hathenbrock that defendant 
and she would vacate the room when they were ready to do so. 
9. That as Lodge Manager Hathenbrock left Room 331, defendant's mother 
slammed the room door. 
10. That Lodge Manager Hathenbrock telephoned the Midvale City Police 
Department. 
11. That Officers Volpe and Proulx were dispatched to the Suburban Lodge of 
Midvale. 
12. That Lodge Manager Hathebrock explained the situation with defendant and her 
mother to the Midvale Police Officers. 
13. That the officers went to Room 331 at the direction of Lodge Manager 
Hathenbrock, to assist in peacefully causing defendant and her mother to vacate the room. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
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14. That the officers observed defendant and her mother in Room 331 through an 
open door. 
15. That the officers entered Room 331 without asking permission to do so from 
defendant not did they have a search warrant in their possession. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes as a matter of law, that 
defendant was a holdover tenant in Room 331, she had no right to demand to remain and the 
Midvale Officers' warrantless entry into thejooip was not unlawful 
t>tlayof DATED this 
Approved as to form: 
HONt 
Third District Court. 
Ronald S. Fujino 
Counsel for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusion Of Law was delivered to Ronald S. Fujino, Counsel for Defendant LESLIE GENE 
LOYA, at Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 on the^Jiday of October, 1999. 
•JtoM!A//tin; 
I 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, 4931 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
Third Judicia/bSmc?1 
OCT 2 S 339 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LESLIE GENE LOYA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
CaseNo.991916283FS 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law and having entered Findings of Fact 
and the Conclusion of Law based thereon; 
HEREBY ORDERS that defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized In Warrantless 
Entry of Hotel Room is denied. ^ i ^ 
DATED this iffrday of f U / f ,1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was delivered to 
Ronald S. Fujino, Counsel for Defendant LESLIE GENE LOYA, at Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the cJHkday of 
October, 1999. 
tiiMHitif* 
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RONALD S. FUJINO, #5387 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 , 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 f/^^A_ 
v' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTTO THE FINDING OF FACT 
Plaintiff, AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
LESLIE GENE LOYA, : Case No. 9919162083FS 
JUDGE J . DENNIS FREDERICK 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW Defendant, LESLIE GENE LOYA, by and through counsel, 
RONALD S. FUJINO, and hereby proposes the following amendments to the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. Although the testimony for the Motion to Suppress 
proceeding is a part of the record1, in an effort to avoid a future remand of this case, 
Ms. Loya seeks to clarify the facts as follows: 
1
 As noted at the conditional plea proceeding, held October 29,1999, Ms. Loya took 
issue with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but wanted to listen to the recorded 
testimony; however, she has been unable to obtain the record. She does not know whether the 
court signed the submitted Findings and Conclusions, and factual clarification is required before 
sentencing. Accordingly, she respectfully submits the facts from memory and notes for the 
State's and the Court's consideration. 
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1) Lodge Manager, Margie Hathenbrock, testified that on the date in 
question, 2:00 p.m. was the focal point and the time with which she was concerned. 
2) On the date in question, the officers' involvement occurred at 
approximately 1:30 p.m. 
DATED this ^"7 day of November. 1999. 
RONJ^LDVS. FUJIN JJI O 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District 
Attonrey, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this day of November, 
1999. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum C 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, 4931 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LESLIE GENE LOYA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER CONCERNING DEFENDANTS 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION 
OF LAW 
CaseNo.991916283FS 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
THE COURT, having reviewed the Defendant's Proposed Amendment to the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusion of Law concerning the Motion to Suppress and Plaintiffs response thereto; 
HEREBY ORDERS THAT: 
1. Proposed Amendment Number 1 is denied; and 
2. Proposed Amendment Number 2 is granted. 
DATED this iW' day of }iUL/ ,499972000 
. ' / * • 
V r < 
DERiqU- £ 
• .'An 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Concerning 
Defendant's Proposed Amendment To The Findings Of Fact And Conclusion Of Law was 
delivered to Ronald S. Fujino, Attorney for Defendant Leslie Gene Loya, by placing it in the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association box located in the Office of the District Attorney for Salt Lake 
County on this f&nA day of December, 1999. 
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